Aviation Insurance Will Destroy General Aviation
by: Tim Brill

I am an ATP / CFI / CFII with commercial seaplane and glider privileges. I have given over 2000 hours of dual instruction, 1500 of which are in tailwheel airplanes specializing in emergency maneuver training, aerobatics, mountain flying and the good old tailwheel endorsement. I operate the Aerobatic Company and Flight School, Inc. (www.aerobaticcompany.com) from Reno-Stead Airport (4SD) in Reno, Nevada. I am a disciple of Rich StowellÕs philosophy regarding spin and emergency maneuver training techniques. I am a member of the following organizations: AOPA, EAA (I am a flight advisor with EAA), NAFI and the IAC. In all my years with general aviation, I personally have never had an accident or incident.

On May 21, 2003, the Citabria suffered an engine failure on take-off, followed by a very hard landing, which destroyed the aircraft. Thankfully, neither the CFI nor the student was injured. In fact, both walked away from the accident (The student did go to the hospital for a precautionary check-up). Other than the Citabria, no other property was damaged, and no one else was injured. However, I am now without insurance for any of my aircraft.

Ms. Edwards of Falcon Insurance stated "Yours is a risk that nobody likes to entertain Š i.e. Tailwheel instruction, aerobatics and a recent loss." The "recent loss" came about as the result of an engine failure during take-off. It had nothing to do with the fact that the Citabria had a tailwheel, or that it was approved for spins and other aerobatic maneuvers. I am not aware of any statistical data that shows that tailwheel or aerobatic trainers are more likely to have an engine failure during take-off than any other airplane.

I cite Rich StowellÕs results of a survey taken of well-known aerobatic schools in 1997 ("well-known" subjectively meant those schools repeatedly listed in the International Aerobatic Club Directory of Aerobatic Schools, those frequently advertising in Sport Aerobatics magazine and other publications, those with printed course outlines and good word-of-mouth reputations, etc.). Twenty responses out of twenty-four surveys mailed were returned completed, representing the following cumulative experience:

1. The range of years engaged in formalized spin/aerobatic training: 5 to 29 years.

2. The estimated total number of hours of spin and aerobatic instruction given: over 135,000 hours.

3. The estimated number of dual instructional spins entered: over 250,000 spins. This figure represents nearly 12,000 vertical miles travelled while spinning with students.

All this exposure to stalls and spins while in a dual training environment, and yet the sum total of stall/spin accidents involving these schools during any phase of any instructional flight whose primary purpose was spin or aerobatic training was ZERO. Six years and no doubt many thousands of additional stall/spins since the survey, this record still stands.

Aside from the tremendous customer dis-service and aggravation perpetuated by our aviation insurance system, the "recent loss" only cost the insurance company $37,500.00, plus a precautionary hospital check-up for the student pilot. NO ONE was killed, NO ONE was injured, NO OTHER PROPERTY was damaged. Just the airplane, thatÕs all. So perhaps because I choose to train pilots in airplanes capable of exploring the full flight envelope in the hopes that such exposure will make them better and safer pilots, and perhaps will SAVE insurance claims over the long term, the perceived risk is too great for insurance to bear.

If my school did not adhere to its grass roots, stick-and-rudder training philosophy, I shudder to think how the outcome of the engine failure on take-off might have otherwise turned out. In addition to the totaled airplane, the typical accident would also have involved at least two fatalities and a whole lot larger pay out than $37,500. SomethingÕs not right with this pictureÉ

In the meantime, AOPA, EAA, IAC, NAFI, American Champion, Aviat Husky, and the rest of you, be warned that you may not have any pilots in your organizations when the insurance companies shut down flight instruction because they do not want to entertain the risk.

Tim Brill

www.aerobaticcompany.com

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